if X = Y , P (X, Y ) = 0 if X = Y . Let P (S, T |X, Y ) denote the probability of a win by Player 1 when respective strategies S and T are employed, conditional on (X, Y ); the corresponding unconditional probability is given by The entries of the payoff matrix are given by 1·P (S, T )+(−1)·[1−P (S, T )], but an equivalent strategic analysis results if this payoff function is replaced by P (S, T ), and we will do so. The preceding description yields a 2 N ×2 N matrix game. But this size can clearly be reduced; for instance, it would be foolish to swap away the highest possible card N , so that rational play requires N ∈ S ∩T . Intuitively, Players 1 and 2 can restrict themselves to "gapless" strategies. That is, Player 1 has a critical number s ≥ 2 where he will keep exactly those cards greater than or equal to s, and Player 2 has a critical number t ≥ 2 where if Player 1 keeps his card, she will keep just those cards that are greater than or equal to t. For brevity we omit the confirmation (in [1] ) of this intuition, i.e., the formal proof that any strategy that keeps k cards is dominated by the strategy that keeps the k cards of highest value. We let S s = {X : X ≥ s} and T t = {Y : Y ≥ t}. Thus our matrix game can be reduced to the (N − 1) × (N − 1) payoff matrix A = [a(s, t)], where a(s, t) = P (S s , T t ) for 2 ≤ s, t ≤ N . Our goal is to establish a radical further reduction, to an explicitlyidentified submatrix game of size at most only 2 × 2, whose solution is therefore given by standard formulas.
Next we provide a formula for a(s, t). The formula depends on the sign of s − t. As preparation, we define for integral s, t ∈ [2, N ],
and observe that f (s, t) = g(s, t) when s = t.
Proof. There are three cases to consider in evaluating (1) for S = S s and T = T t . If X < s ≤ t then Player 1 swaps, and wins iff X < Y and Z < Y . If s ≤ X < t then Player 1 keeps X; since Player 2 wins if he keeps (i.e., if Y ≥ t), Player 1 wins iff Y < t and Z < X, the latter corresponding to X − 1 possibilities for Z if X < Y but to only X − 2 (the value Y is ruled out) if Y < X. Finally, if X ≥ t then Player 1 wins iff either X > Y ≥ t or Y < t ≤ X and Z < X (the value Y is ruled out for Z). These cases yield three groups of terms in the evaluation of (1):
Heroic algebra, and the formula for the sum of the first s − 1 perfect squares, yield the stated result.
Lemma 2. For s ≥ t, 2a(s, t)/p = g(s, t).
Proof. Now there are two cases to consider. If X < s then Player 1 swaps, and wins iff X < Y and Z < Y . And if X ≥ s ≥ t then Player 1 keeps X, winning iff either Y < t and Z < X, or X > Y ≥ t. These cases yield two groups of terms in the evaluation of (1):
from which algebraic manipulation leads to the stated result.
The payoff function a(s, t) has some desirable properties. By straightforward algebra, one can show [1] that the columns of the payoff matrix A are discrete concave and the rows of A are discrete convex. That is,
Howard [8] proves that in a game that satisfies the concavity condition of Lemma 3 Player 1 has an optimal mixed strategy that mixes at most two consecutive pure strategies. Analogous results apply for Player 2 when the convexity condition of Lemma 4 occurs. (An alternative treatment, whose preview in [1] was apparently the stimulus for [8] , occurs in [2] .) Since the only difference between consecutive strategies S s and S s+1 is how they treat card s, then the above results give us: Theorem 1. In our variant of N -card Le Her, Player 1 has a critical card s such that he will always swap cards below s, always keep cards above s and will keep or swap card s according to a mixed strategy. Likewise, Player 2 has a critical card t such that when Player 1 keeps his card, she will always swap cards below t, always keep cards above t and will keep or swap card t according to a mixed strategy.
To determine which consecutive strategies are optimal, suppose that a(s, t) can be interpolated by a function A(s, t) defined on the real domain [2, N ] × [2, N ], where for fixed t, A is a concave function of s. By [5] , such a game has an optimal pure strategy s * . The authors prove in [2] that in the discrete version of such a game, Player 1 has an optimal strategy which mixes at most the pure strategies s * and s * . Likewise, if A is a convex function of t, then the continuous game will have a pure optimal strategy t * , and the original game will optimally mix on pure strategies t * and t * . The right-hand sides of equations (2-4) yield extensions (H, F, G) of the respective functions (h, f, g) from integer to continuous variables (s, t) ∈ [2, N ], with F = G when s = t. By Lemmas 1 and 2, a "natural" extension A(s, t) of a(s, t) to a continuous-game payoff function is given by
To solve the game as proposed in the previous paragraph, we need to verify that A(s, t) -or equivalently, 2 p A(s, t) -is concave in s for fixed t. We first observe by straightforward differentiation that
which is non-positive (as desired) since s, t ∈ [2, N ], and that
which has the desired sign except in the upper left corner (defined by s + t < 5) of the square [2, N ] × [2, N ]. In view of (5), it is also necessary for concavity (in s) to check that ∂F/∂s ≥ ∂G/∂s when s = t. This condition reduces to the explicit form In what follows, we use the floor and ceiling symbols x and x to denote the greatest integer less than or equal to x and the least integer greater than or equal to x, respectively.
Proof. For continuous (s, t) with 2 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ N , we have
so that A(s, t) is nonincreasing in t. And if s ≤ t, then
yielding the same conclusion if also t ≤ Θ. Thus a(s, t) is nonincreasing in t for t ≤ Θ, yielding the desired result when N is even so that Θ is integral. And if N is odd, then a(s, t) is nonincreasing in t for t ≤ Θ = (N + 1)/2; the remaining desired conclusion a(s, Θ ) ≥ a(s, Θ ) follows from (7) It follows from Lemma 5 that Player 2's pure strategies in the matrix game can be restricted by t ≥ Θ , so that the same can be done in the continuous extension. We may assume that N ≥ 4 (since if N = 3 the matrix game is already 2 × 2), so that the last restriction implies t ≥ 3, which in junction with s ≥ 2 rules out the troublesome corner s + t < 5. Thus the concavity-in-s property has been established. We note in passing the following intuitively plausible interpretation, in the matrix game, of the domination-enforced condition (6): If Player 1 has kept his card, then Player 2 should swap any card that is not above average.
We continue to assume N ≥ 4, and now know that the continuous game with payoff function A(s, t) restricted to the rectangle [2, N ] × [ Θ , N ] has some optimal pure strategy s * for Player 1, and that in the matrix game Player 1 has an optimal strategy which mixes at most the consecutive rows s * and s * . To identify these rows, we proceed to determine s * . By the "maximin" definition of an optimal strategy for Player 1, s * is characterized by maximizing, over [2, N ] , the function
i.e., µ(s) = A(s, t * (s)) where t * (s) minimizes A(s, t) over [ Θ , N ]. By (7), we have t * (s) ≥ s if s < N and can take t * (s) ≥ s if s = N , so that
where
To determine t * (s), we use (8) to equate ∂F/∂t to 0, obtaining the t-value τ * (s) = Θ + (s − 1)(s − 2)/2(N − 2).
It follows from (8) that t * (s) is given by τ * (s) if the latter lies in the interval [max(s, Θ ), N ]. Analyzing the conditions for membership of τ * (s) in this interval, we find that τ * (s) ≥ s is equivalent to (N − s) 2 + (s − 2) ≥ 0, which is true. Next, τ * (s) ≤ N is equivalent to (s − 1)(s − 2) ≤ (N − 2) 2 , which is true for s ≤ N − 1 but not for s = N . Finally, since s ≥ 2, τ * (s) ≥ Θ is true when N is even (so that Θ is integer), but for odd N it is equivalent to
which fails for sufficiently small s.
However, one can show (see [1] ) that the "troublesome cases" mentioned above need never occur in an optimal solution. That is, without loss of optimality, Player 1 can restrict himself to
These conclusions follow (respectively) from the next two additional domination results about the matrix game, whose proofs (in [1] ) are again omitted for brevity:
We have now justified equating t * (s) to τ * (s), i.e.,
Substitution of (12) into (10), and differentiation, yield for −6(N − 2) 2 dµ/ds the expression
Its derivative is a quadratic function whose discriminant −36(8N 2 − 68N + 110), is negative (hence φ(s) is increasing) for N ≥ 7, where it is easily verified that φ(N − 1) > 0 > φ(Θ). Thus for N ≥ 7 the unique real root of dµ/ds = 0, is interior to the interval [Θ, N − 1], hence satisfies (11), so that s * can be calculated as the real root of φ(s) = 0. As for the remaining small values of N , according to (11) Player 1's pure strategies can be confined to s = 3 if N = 4, to s = 4 if N = 5, and to the consecutive pair s ∈ {4, 5} if N = 6. In these three cases the restriction t ≥ Θ translates into t ∈ {3, 4}, t ∈ {4, 5} and t ∈ {4, 5, 6} respectively; in the last of these the third column of the 2 × 3 submatrix coincides with the second, permitting reduction to a 2 × 2 game. So for what follows, we can and will assume N ≥ 7.
We have showed that the (N − 1) × (N − 1) matrix game can be reduced to a subgame involving the last N − Θ + 1 columns and at most a consecutive pair ( s * , s * ) of rows, and a procedure for determining this pair has been given. As noted after Lemma 4, we are also assured that in principle this subgame can be reduced further to a sub-subgame of dimensions at most 2 × 2 involving consecutive columns ( t * * , t * * ). For given N it seems brute-force practical to proceed by successive solution of 2 × 2 sub-subgames involving consecutive columns, retaining the solution with the smallest payoff value. However, it would be more elegant
